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This paper analyses whether opacity of bank creditworthiness increases during crisis periods 
and if the conservativeness of CRAs changes through business cycles. Univariate and 
multivariate methodologies are used: data from Moody’s and S&P on credit ratings and watch 
status for 133 commercial banks across 17 developed countries from 2007 to 2015 is employed. 
The univariate analysis is a unique technique that provides a new perspective to assess whether 
splits between CRAs are defined as permanent or temporary. The evidence demonstrates that 
Moody’s and S&P frequently disagree. S&P is shown to be the more conservative CRA overall, 
however, the extent to which Moody’s issues higher ratings decreases over time until it 
becomes the more conservative CRA. The paper is the first of its kind to establish that the 
conservativeness of Moody’s and S&P changes throughout business cycles, which should 






















 ‘Credit rating agencies play a crucial role in providing information about the ability 
and willingness of issuers, including governments and private firms, to meet their financial 
obligations’ (Almeida et al [2016] p.255). Credit ratings agencies (CRAs) played a large role 
in the 2007-09 financial crisis, whereby ‘the crisis was exacerbated by a combination of faulty 
ratings methodologies, conflicts of interest, and overreliance on ratings by banks, investors and 
regulators’ (Deb et al [2011, p.3]).  
The vast majority of debt issuers have ratings assigned by more than one CRA. 
Mahlmann [2009] suggests that in order for firms to have access to a broader pool of investors 
it is necessary for issuers to have ratings from the two major CRAs (Moody’s and S&P). 
Differences of opinion across CRAs have become more prevalent during and since the financial 
crisis. For example, Alsakka et al [2017] show that at least 40% of European sovereign rating 
observations reflect different opinions across Fitch, Moody’s and S&P.    
The main aim of this paper is to investigate whether banks’ opacity, and therefore rating 
disagreement between CRAs, increases during crisis periods. The second aim is to consider 
whether the relative conservativeness of CRAs changes during crisis periods. Compared to 
prior related literature, further insights are possible due to the inclusion of watchlist status 
within the dataset. Morgan [2002] and Iannotta [2006] find that banks are more opaque than 
non-bank debt issuers, and that this leads to more disagreements in ratings between CRAs.  In 
addition, this paper extends the work of Livingston et al [2010] who find that Moody’s is the 
more conservative CRA when issuing corporate rating opinions, whereas Vu et al [2015] find 
the opposite result for sovereigns. 
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Split ratings arise when different ratings are assigned to the same issuer by more than 
one CRA. When CRAs are assigning a solicited bank rating,1 a common perception might be 
that the CRAs will agree on the assigned rating as they use the same information, such as 
accounting data and soft information, provided by the issuer. Iannotta [2006] demonstrates that 
this perception is false and finds that greater financial assets and larger capital ratios increase 
CRAs’ differences in opinion. 
Morgan [2002] believes that a disagreement between CRAs is a good proxy for the 
uncertainty associated with asymmetric information about the debt issuer. Flannery et al [2004] 
state that all firms suffer from information asymmetry to some extent, however in most 
industries this information asymmetry between inside and outside investors tends to be 
resolved via market-based mechanisms. Financial firms differ in this respect due to the 
difficulty for outside investors to value assets, hence the need for government regulation 
(Flannery et al [2004]). The banking industry is one of the most regulated industries in the 
world, mainly due to systemic risk and depositor protection (Iannotta [2006]). Morgan [2002, 
p.874]) states that ‘Money goes in, and money goes out, but the risks taken in the process of 
intermediation are hard to observe from outside the bank’ (p.874). He also suggests that the 
consequences of asset opacity within the banking sector, such as contagion and bank runs, are 
a reasonable justification for government regulation.  
Prior research has failed to fully address banking sector split ratings and the datasets 
used in previous articles on this issue pre-date the global financial crisis. This paper makes a 
novel contribution in that it investigates the effects of the sub-prime crisis (2007-09) and the 
European crisis (2010-12), while being able to draw comparisons in the post-crisis period 
(2013-15). Due to the additional uncertainty arising during crisis periods, the creditworthiness 
 
1 Solicited ratings are requested by borrowers, they provide CRAs with private information and pay the CRA for 
the rating. Unsolicited ratings are assigned by CRAs to issuers based only on publicly available information 
without the request of the debt issuers (e.g. Byoun et al [2014]). 
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of a bank is more difficult to ascertain and therefore CRAs may disagree more often than during 
non-crisis periods. This paper makes an additional contribution to the literature on bank split 
ratings by using watchlist information in addition to rating levels. 
This paper addresses the following research questions: Does bank opacity increase 
during crisis periods? Does conservativeness between Moody’s and S&P change during crisis 
and non-crisis periods? The main results are summarised as follows: Moody’s and S&P 
frequently disagree (74% of observations) in their bank rating opinions during the period 2007-
2015. The results show that CRAs agree most frequently during the post-crisis period (36%) 
and have similar levels of agreements during the sub-prime crisis and European crisis periods 
(at 21% of observations). With regard to conservativeness, the results show that during the 
different time periods the percentage of times Moody’s issues a higher rating begins to decrease 
and the percentage of times S&P issues a higher rating increases. In addition, the TWS has 
reduced substantially from 3.21 points in the sub-prime crisis to -0.18 points in the post-crisis 
period. This suggests that conservativeness between the two CRAs changes in response to 
levels of ambiguity.  
The results confirm the prior anticipation, in the sense that times of crisis are 
characterised by higher levels of information asymmetry, and such ambiguity induces a greater 
prevalence of split bank ratings. Disagreements are more common for larger banks, those with 
a low credit rating, and those which reside in either a crisis country (PIIGS2) or North America. 
Regarding conservativeness, the overall results show that although S&P is the more 
conservative CRA, the extent to which Moody’s issues a higher rating than S&P decreases 
across the time frame. 
 
2 PIIGS refers to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. These countries were those most seriously affected 
by the European sovereign debt crisis.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature 
closely related to split ratings, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 describes the 
methodology, Section 5 examines the results of the analysis and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
Literature review  
In the US, most publicly traded bond issuers receive rating assignments from the two 
major CRAs, and research shows that corporate ratings issued by Moody’s and S&P can differ 
over 50% of the time (see Cantor et al [1997]), resulting in so-called split ratings. Prior research 
has considered reasons why a firm receives a split rating from the two CRAs and several 
different interpretations are proposed. Ederington [1986] suggests that split ratings are simply 
due to random errors, while Livingston et al [2008] attribute splits to expected future changes 
in ratings. 
Morgan [2002] investigates rating disagreements between Moody’s and S&P using a 
sample of 7,862 (848 Banking issuers, 150 insurance firms and 6,894 other sectors) new bonds 
issued between January 1983 and July 1993. Morgan [2002] argues that the idea of a split rating 
is simple: ‘if bank risk is harder to observe, the raters in the business judging risk should 
disagree more often over bank bond issues’ (p.874).   
Morgan [2002] finds that the pattern of disagreement between Moody’s and S&P 
suggests that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other sectors. He 
suggests that this uncertainty stems from ‘certain assets, loans and trading assets in particular, 
the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change’ (Morgan [2002, p.874]). ‘The gap 
between the mean ratings by Moody's and S&P was four times larger for bank issuers than for 
the typical nonbank issuer’ (Morgan [2002, p.876]). 
Following from Morgan [2002], Iannotta [2006] uses 2,473 (2051 banking issuers, 16 
insurance firms and 406 other sectors) European bonds issued during 1993-2003 and examines 
whether or not banking sector issuers are more opaque than non-banking issuers. Iannotta 
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[2006] finds that, as a whole, there is strong evidence that banks produce more uncertainty than 
non-banks. Morgan [2002] find that insurance firms generated even more disagreement than 
banking sector issuers. This disagreement in results between Iannotta [2006] and Morgan 
[2002] could be due to the small number of insurance firms used within their respective 
samples, 0.65% (Iannotta [2006]) and 1.91% (Morgan [2002]). 
Flannery et al [1998, 2004, 2013] disagree with Morgan [2002], but approach their 
research differently. All three papers explore whether financial firms are more opaque than 
non-financial firms but, unlike Morgan [2002], they do not use credit ratings in their analysis. 
Flannery et al [1998] review previous literature on the ability of market forces to identify and 
control risk-taking in banking firms. The research finds that there is no difference in the 
behaviour of share prices between banking and non-banking firms as both types of firm adjust 
promptly to new information. Flannery et al [2004] examine whether or not U.S. banking firms 
exhibit more or less asset opacity than non-banking firms using the market microstructure 
equity properties. They find very similar trading properties between banking and non-banking 
firms and that IBES3 earnings forecasts indicate that banking assets are ‘not usually opaque, 
they are simply boring’ (p.419).       
Flannery et al [2013] use a sample of publicly trading bank holding companies and 
examine the trading characteristics during normal and crisis periods between 1993 and 2009. 
They find limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. 
‘Although the possibility that banking firms are ‘‘opaque’’ has played a central role in the 
2007-09 financial crisis, existing empirical evidence on the opacity of banking firms is mixed’ 
(Flannery [2013, p.56]). 
Split ratings could also arise from the different methods used by CRAs. For example, 
Cantor and Packer [1995] state that S&P base a rating on the overall capacity of the issuer to 
 
3 Institutional Brokers' Estimate System 
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fulfil their financial obligation, whereas Moody’s assessment is based on some judgement of 
recovery in the event of loss. With regard to S&P, they ‘...continually assess and reassess their 
rating methodologies’ and ‘adopt changes as needed to respond to the changing needs of 
investors, issuers and markets’.4 Their ratings are ‘... a tool to evaluate credit risk, expressing 
our opinion about the likelihood that debt issued by companies and governments will be repaid 
in full and on time’.5 This suggests that S&P continue to base rating assignments on the overall 
capacity of the issuer to fulfil their financial obligation. With regard to Moody’s, their ratings 
are ‘...judgements about the future on the one hand, and since they are used by investors as a 
means of protection, on the other, the effort is made when assigning ratings to look at ‘worst’ 
possibilities in the ‘visible’ future, rather than solely at the past record and the status of the 
present’.6 This proposes that Moody’s assessment continues to be based on some judgement of 
recovery in the event of loss.  
Based on the differing methods used by CRAs, Moody’s is more likely to issue a more 
conservative (lower) rating than S&P (Cantor et al [1997]; Morgan [2002]; Livingston et al 
[2010]). Cantor et al [1997] find that when the ratings are split, S&P had a higher rating on 
54.6% of occasions. Hence supporting the view that Moody’s is viewed as being the more 
conservative CRA. Cantor et al [1997] show that ‘the probability of Moody’s rating higher than 
S&P has varied over time, beginning at slightly less than 40 per cent in 1983-1984, rising to 
around the 50 per cent level during the 1985-1988 period, but returning to the 40 per cent level 
in the 1990s’ (p.7). 
Livingston et al [2010] examine U.S. non-financial corporate bond issues between 







the two CRAs and assign more weight to the more conservative CRA, Moody’s, especially 
after 1998.  
Morgan [2002] states that a conservative rater (a rater that worries more about over-
rating) errs on the safe side by choosing stricter cut-offs and differences in cut-offs will, in 
general, cause lop-sided splits. Morgan [2002] suggests that in more opaque industries the 
difference in cut-offs will be wider and the splits will be more lop-sided as the conservative 
rater will err even further on the safe side due to the additional uncertainty. Furthermore, 
Morgan [2002] finds that Moody’s was more likely to take the conservative side over splits 
than S&P. 
Data and hypotheses 
This paper investigates watch opinion splits between Moody’s and S&P during the most 
volatile financial period of the 21st century. Previous research (Sy [2004]; Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym [2012]; [2013]) includes rating, outlook and watch announcements in its analysis when 
investigating rating opinions, however this research does not focus on banking sector issuers. 
As this paper focuses solely on banks, the most opaque industry (Morgan [2002]), it explores 
a different perspective at a finer level of detail by only focusing on more immediate, short term 
responses from CRAs, i.e. watch announcements. 
The first research question examines whether bank opacity increases during crisis 
periods, leading to the following three hypotheses: 
H1. Bank opacity increases during times of crisis because Moody’s and S&P tend to disagree 
more on their rating assignments during the sub-prime crisis and European debt crisis compared 
to the post-crisis period.  
H2. Moody’s and S&P agree more on Australasian banks creditworthiness compared to North 
American and European banks because this region was less affected by the sub-prime and 
European debt crises.    
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H3. Moody’s and S&P tend to disagree more on their rating assignments of North American 
banks during the sub-prime crisis period (2007-09) and disagree more on European banks 
during the European crisis, compared with the other two periods.     
The second research question investigates whether the conservativeness between 
Moody’s and S&P changes during crisis and non-crisis periods, leading to the following 
hypotheses: 
H4. S&P is the more conservative CRA during times of crisis (sub-prime and European) 
because they change their ratings more quickly than Moody’s7.   
H5. Moody’s is the more conservative CRA during the post-crisis period. 
The dataset consists of long-term issuer ratings and senior unsecured (foreign currency) 
ratings from Moody’s and S&P during the period 1st January 2007 to 31st December 2015, for 
commercial banks in 17 developed countries: North America (USA and Canada), EU countries 
as at 1st January 1995, also known as the EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK) 
and Australasia (Australia and New Zealand). Developed countries are chosen to avoid rating 
restrictions due to the sovereign ceiling policy8.  
The sources of the ratings data are the Moody’s website and the S&P Capital IQ 
database. Data on size (Total Assets) and Operating Profit are collected from Bankscope. The 
sample period of 2007-15 is characterised by two crises, namely the sub-prime crisis (2007-
09) and the European sovereign debt crisis (2010-12). 2013-15 represents the post-crisis period.   
 
7 CRAs us an ‘expected loss’ approach which for Moody’s includes assessments of ‘probability of default’ and 
‘loss given default’ on an issuer, whereas S&P only assesses probability of default (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 
2010). 
8 The sovereign ceiling policy requires a firms’ rating to remain at or below the sovereign rating of their country 
of domicile (Almeida et al [2016]). 
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To analyse split ratings, selected banks must be rated by both CRAs to establish a split 
or non-split rating relationship.9 The final data set contains a total of 291,288 daily credit 
opinions across 13310 banks in 17 different countries (see Appendix 1).  
A mapped 60-point numerical scale of watchlist opinions is applied to the letter rating: 
AAA/Aaa = 60, AAA/Aaa negative watch = 59 ...  CC/Ca negative watch = 2 to C/SD =1. The 
reason for choosing a 60-point rather than the more widely used 58-point scale (Sy [2004]; 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym [2012]) is due to the exclusion of outlook opinions from the dataset. 
Therefore, each rating has a positive (+1) and negative (-1) to incorporate watch events and the 
last 10 points on the scale are considered separately rather than grouping them together.   
As a robustness test, the analysis is extended using a 20-notch scale, excluding the 
watchlist status. The mapped 20-notch scale is applied to the letter ratings of both CRAs for 
the ratings only. AAA/Aaa = 20, AA+/Aa1 = 19... CCC-/Caa3 = 2 to CC/Ca/SD/D = 1. The 
full mappings for both scales and both CRAs are presented in Appendix 2.  
Methodology 
Univariate analysis 
It is crucial to differentiate between temporary and more permanent split ratings. A 
temporary split arises when there is a difference in the timings of similar rating actions across 
CRAs for the same issuer and it does not reflect any lasting fundamental differences in two 
CRAs’ views on credit quality. Therefore, it is important to focus on more persistent rather 
than temporary splits, or to give weighting to observed splits according to their persistence. To 
achieve this, a Time Weighted Split (TWS) measure is generated. This refinement has not been 
 
9 Belgium and Greece are not included because there are no banks that are rated by both CRAs, or the banks are 
rated by both CRAs but do not have consistent debt type ratings This can arise because we select long-term 
issuer ratings and senior unsecured (foreign currency) ratings, e.g. Moody’s deposit ratings are excluded.  
10 The relatively low number of banks are due to the data restrictions, a bank had to be publicly listed and rated 
by both CRAs (Moody’s and S&P) at some point during 2007-2015. This requirement significantly reduces the 
number of banks available to be used in the dataset.   
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used in prior research (for banks nor other rating segments) and is therefore a further original 
aspect of this paper.   
A split is defined as different numerical ratings from the two CRAs (on either the 60 
point or 20 notch scale). This can occur if the issuer has different ratings from the CRAs and/or 
an issuer has the same rating from both yet one CRA has placed the issuer on a 
positive/negative watch whilst the other has not.    
The TWS is calculated for each bank i: 
 
TWSi, = ∑ (𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 i  x  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠)𝑁𝑡=1                      (1) 
                              N 
Where;  
split = Moody’s numerical rating – S&P numerical rating for bank i on a given day. 
days = the number of days for which the split rating for bank i takes a given value.  
N = total number of days per sample e.g. annual, crisis period or whole sample.  
In general, larger and/or more persistent split ratings in a particular direction (e.g. 
Moody’s rating persistently higher than S&P) within a given time period will produce a higher 
value of TWS for a given bank. A time-weighted absolute split is also utilised, i.e. using the 
absolute value of split in the above method. Using absolute values extends the analysis to 
examine solely differences of opinion between the CRAs, without considering which is more 
conservative.  
The results are divided into three elements: overall, region, and time periods. Regions 
are split into three: North America, Australasia and Europe and there are three time periods: 
sub-prime crisis (2007-09), European-crisis (2010-12) and post-crisis (2013-15). In addition, 





An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is used to observe whether there is a 
relationship between the variable of interest (TWS) and the independent variables (Bank Size, 
Sovereign Split and the Return on Assets) plus dummy variables (Sub-prime crisis period, 
European crisis period, Crisis country, Bank with a low credit rating and region).  
The explanatory variables are selected by using two of the most commonly used 
accounting-based proxies, bank size (Net Assets) and profitability (Return on Assets (RoA)). 
Bank size is chosen because previous research suggests that larger banks are less opaque than 
smaller banks as more information is publicly available for larger banks (Morgan [2002]) and 
that bank uncertainty decreases with fixed assets (Iannotta [2006]). RoA is chosen because 
more profitable banks tend to be less concerned about the credit rating assigned. Banks with 
lower credit ratings may face higher financing costs which could lead to lower profitability 
(Hau et al [2013]).  
Sovereign split was also selected because previous research (Williams et al [2013]; 
Drago and Gallo [2017]) suggests there is a strong link between a change in the sovereign 
rating and a bank rating within that country. Therefore, if the sovereign has a split rating, the 
bank rating may be more prone to be split. Dummy variables which represent the year of the 
rating action, the location of the bank and whether the rating is investment grade or speculative 
were also used.  
Equation 2 aims to identify the potential determinants of split watch announcements. 
Equation 3 aims to identify in what circumstances a CRA is more conservative. For Eq. 2, 
larger splits between CRAs will provide a positive coefficient and for smaller splits the 
coefficient will be negative. For Eq. 3, a positive coefficient will represent S&P being the more 
conservative CRA and a negative coefficient will demonstrate Moody’s being the more 




𝑊𝐴 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  δ1𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑡 + δ2𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑌𝑡 + δ3CC𝑖 + δ4𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + δ5𝐴𝑃𝑖 + δ6𝑁𝐴𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖
𝑊 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + δ1𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑌𝑡 + δ3CC𝑖 + δ4𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + δ5𝐴𝑃𝑖 + δ6𝑁𝐴𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡   (3) 
 
𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖  is a continuous variable and represents the Time Weighted Split per bank i. Both 
equations (2) and (3) use the 60-point scale, represented by (W). (A) represents the use of 
absolute values.  
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐵𝑖,𝑡 represents the size of bank i in year t. The natural log of Total Assets per bank in US$ 
is used to establish Bank Size and this information is gathered using Bankscope. This variable 
is adjusted by the United States World Bank GDP deflator/inflator11 with a base year of 2007.  
 
𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 represents the split sovereign rating for the bank’s country. It takes the value of the 
Moody’s sovereign rating minus the S&P sovereign rating, using the 20-notch scale at the end 
of the year (and could be equal to zero).  
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 represents the Return on Assets (RoA) for bank i in year t, calculated by collecting the 
operating profit figure in US$ from.12 Operating profit is adjusted using the World Bank GDP 
deflator/inflator with a base year of 2007. Operating Profit is used as it ignores the capital 
structure of the bank and removes any cross-country differences in tax policies.   
 
𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑡 represents the dummy variable for the sub-prime crisis and takes the value of 1 for 2007-
09 and 0 otherwise.  
 
11 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG. 
12 As profitability measures are highly variable, the data is winsorized to remove any outliers, at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Both winsorizing and truncating (trimming) were used for different estimations. The results using 
winsorizing are presented, because they are slightly more conservative. 
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𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑌𝑡 represents the dummy variable for the European debt crisis period, and takes the value 
of 1 for 2010-12 and 0 otherwise. 
  
𝐶𝐶𝑖 represents a bank residing in a Crisis Country. This takes a value of 1 if the bank is in 
Portugal (bailout), Ireland (bailout), Spain (spillover) or Italy (spillover), and 0 if not.  
 
𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents a bank with a low credit rating at year t. The variable takes the value of 1 if 
the bank had a rating of Baa1/BBB+ or lower at the end of the year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
𝐴𝑃𝑖 represents a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if bank i is located in Australasia 
(Australia and New Zealand) and 0 otherwise.  
 
𝑁𝐴𝑖 represents a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if bank i is located in the USA or Canada 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
Europe is used as the reference region. 
 
Some estimations use a clustered standard error with clusters at the bank level.13 
Robustness check 
An ordered probit model using the 20-notch scale is used as a robustness check to further test 
the stated hypotheses. Due to the discrete ordinal nature of credit ratings many researchers use 
an ordered probit model in their investigations (Morgan [2002]; Güttler and Wahrenburg 
[2007]; Alsakka and ap Gwilym [2010a], [2012a]). The model will estimate whether there is a 
 
13 in other cases, the White [1980] procedure is used to control for potential heteroscedasticity.  
16 
 
disagreement between CRAs or not (Eq. 4) and which CRA is more conservative (Eq. 5) based 
on the independent variable parameters.  
 
𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑃𝐿 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  δ1𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑡 + δ2𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑌𝑡 + δ3CC𝑖 + δ4𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + δ5𝐴𝑃𝑖 + δ6𝑁𝐴𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
 
𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖
𝐶𝑂𝑁 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + δ1𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑌𝑡 + δ3CC𝑖 + δ4𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + δ5𝐴𝑃𝑖 + δ6𝑁𝐴𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡  
(5) 
 
Disagreement is measured in Eq. (4) by the SPL (0/1) variable. Conservativeness is measured 
in Eq. (5) by the CON (-1/0/1)14 variable. The independent variables are discussed above.   
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Exhibit 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the dataset.15 The banks are selected 
mainly from developed countries, providing 96.4% of observations at investment grade. The 
bank with the highest Operating profit is Wells Fargo Bank reaching US$28 billion in 2015 
and the least profitable bank in the sample is the Bank of Scotland PLC making a loss of 
US$23.5 billion in 2009; the mean profit of all banks in the sample is US$1.7 billion.16  
The mean bank size in the sample is US$322 billion, the smallest bank in the sample is 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company with total net assets of US$159 million in 2009 and 
the largest is Barclays Bank with total net assets of US$2.9 trillion in 2009. The average return 
on assets in the sample is 0.89%, with a maximum 16.19% and a minimum -11.43%. The 
remaining variables show the total number of observations for each.  
 
14 If Moody’s issues a higher rating than S&P there will be a positive difference (1) and if S&P issues a higher 
rating, there will be a negative difference (-1) and no disagreement (0). 
15 The figures used here are inflated/deflated using the annual United States World Bank GDP. 
16 The figures used here are also inflated/deflated using the annual United States World Bank GDP. 
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Exhibit 2 displays the extent of the differences between Moody’s and S&P using the 
60-point and 20-notch scales, which identifies that the two CRAs agree around 25% and 30% 
of the time, respectively. The next largest category is Moody’s issuing an opinion on 
creditworthiness 3 points higher than S&P, based on the 60-point scale, around 24% of the 
time. Due to the inclusion of watch level opinions in the 60-point scale, three points higher is 
the equivalent of 1 notch using the 20-notch scale. The 20-notch scale demonstrates 
characteristics similar to those of a transition matrix, where the highest probability is centred 
on the 0 point, i.e. non-split and the second largest probability is directly next to the centre and 
the further away the cell is from the centre the less likely it is to occur (see Bangia et al [2002]).  
The first research question examines whether bank opacity increases during crisis 
periods, leading to the following three hypotheses: 
H1. Bank opacity increases during times of crisis because Moody’s and S&P tend to 
disagree more on their rating assignments during the sub-prime crisis and European debt 
crisis compared to the post-crisis period.  
Exhibit 3 displays the results for the 60-point scale for the whole sample, showing that 
the overall level of disagreements between Moody’s and S&P from 2007 to 2015 are 74.24% 
of cases.  
To answer H1, Exhibit 3 shows that CRAs agree more during the post-crisis period 
(35.57%) and have similar levels of disagreements during the sub-prime crisis (20.79%) and 
European crisis (20.75%). Exhibit 4 uses the 20-notch scale and further supports the results of 
the 60-point scale, CRAs agree 39.73% of the time in the post-crisis period compared with 
23.47% and 25.95% in the sup-prime and European crises. This suggests that in times of 
uncertainty CRAs tend to disagree more frequently, while they tend to agree more frequently 
during more tranquil times, particularly within an opaque industry (Morgan [2002]). Therefore, 
H1 can be accepted. 
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H2. Moody’s and S&P agree more on Australasian banks creditworthiness compared to 
North American and European banks because this region was less affected by the sub-
prime and European debt crises. 
 Exhibit 3 splits the data into regions, the results show that CRAs agree most on 
Australasian banks, 42.86% of occasions compared to the other regions. 21.43% and 25.42% 
of the time, for North American banks and European banks, respectively. This finding is 
supported when the regions are split into time-periods giving a rate of agreements between 
CRAs of 53.89%, for Australian banks during the post-crisis periods. The extent of 
disagreements is lower for Australasian banks compared to the other regions in all scenarios. 
The results are further supported by the multivariate analysis because the Australasian variable 
is significant with a negative coefficient, suggesting less splits within that region. The results 
in Exhibit 4 using the 20-notch scale further support the results found in Exhibit 3 in addition 
to the results of the ordered probit analysis in Exhibit 7. Therefore, H2 can be accepted.       
H3. Moody’s and S&P tend to disagree more on their rating assignments of North 
American banks during the sub-prime crisis period (2007-09) and disagree more on 
European banks during the European crisis, compared with the other two periods.   
Exhibit 3, panel II shows disagreements between CRAs split into regions and time 
periods. During the sub-prime crisis CRAs disagree 80% of the time for North American banks, 
although the results show a larger level of disagreements for European banks (82%) during the 
same period. During the European crisis CRAs disagree 85% of the time for North American 
banks and 79% of the time for European banks.  Even though the percentage of disagreements 
is larger for European banks in the sub-prime crisis, the extent of disagreement is higher for 
North American banks (4.54 points compared to 3.79 points for European banks). However, 
the extent of disagreements from European banks during the European crisis is less than North 
American banks (3.16 points compared to 3.29 points).  
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These results were unexpected because the main level of disagreement between CRAs 
for North American banks was expected to occur during the sub-prime crisis and for European 
banks during the European crisis, as these would be the most ambiguous times for both of the 
respective regions. This could have been due to the differing watch policies (Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym [2012]) used by the CRAs, but the results using only the ratings (20-notch) scale are 
similar so this theory cannot be supported. It is not fully apparent why these results were not 
as expected, however it could be due to the level of European investment into the North 
American housing market, with Northern Rock being the first European victim of such an 
economic shock (FT [2008]). The bank run on Northern Rock could have been the catalyst to 
a spillover/contagion effect which spread into the rest of Europe. Morgan [2002] suggests that 
one of the consequences of asset opaqueness within the banking sector is contagion and this 
could be compounded due to the lead lag relationship that exists between the three main CRAs. 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym [2010] found there is a strong interdependence amongst the three main 
CRAs. However, they also find that S&P is the most independent CRA and it is notable that 
S&P have made a large number of rating changes whereas Moody’s have delayed making such 
changes during these crisis periods. Therefore, H3 cannot be accepted.   
Reasons split ratings occur 
Two earlier papers, Ederington [1986] and Morgan [2002], have differing view points 
on why split ratings occur. Ederington [1986] argues that split ratings are caused simply by 
random errors of the two CRAs, implying that split-rated bonds are likely to have credit risks 
bordering the rating cut-off points, known as the “the random error hypothesis of split ratings” 
(Livingston et al [2007], p.49). Morgan [2002] believes that as banks are the most opaque 
industry they are more likely to receive split ratings than firms from other industries,  this is 
known as “the asset opaqueness hypothesis of split ratings” (Livingston et al [2007], p.49). 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym [2012] find that S&P have more emphasis on short term accuracy and 
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Moody’s places its emphasis on long term stability. Therefore, this difference in rating policies 
could be the reason for split ratings. 
Exhibit 5 displays the reasons behind the higher level of disagreements between CRAs. 
A positive coefficient suggests a reason for more splits and these results suggest that if a 
country’s sovereign rating is split there is more likely to be a disagreement between CRAs for 
a bank rating in that country. This is due to the strong link between a change in the sovereign 
rating and a bank rating within that country (Williams et al [2013]; Drago and Gallo [2017]).  
In addition, the results suggest that Moody’s and S&P disagree mostly on banks’ 
creditworthiness within one of the identified crisis countries (Portugal, Ireland, Spain or Italy). 
PIIGS countries were some of the worst affected OECD countries in the European sovereign 
crisis, which reflects Eurozone uncertainty within that period contributing to larger 
disagreements on bank ratings between Moody’s and S&P. Furthermore, the multivariate 
results suggest that CRAs will disagree if a bank has a speculative grade rating or within North 
America, which was largely affected by the sub-prime crisis. The negative coefficient for the 
Return on Assets (ROA) variable was expected because more profitable banks are presumed 
to be less risky (Iannotta [2006]) and therefore fewer disagreements between CRAs should 
occur. 
Exhibit 7 displays the results of the robustness test using the ordered probit regression 
(Eq.4). The results here support those found in Exhibit 5 as disagreements between CRAs tend 
to occur more where the sovereign rating of the country is split, within a crisis country, for 
speculative grade banks and within North America. The main difference here is the addition of 
splits occurring for larger banks (Iannotta [2006]). 
The high number of disagreements between the two CRAs could be due to differing 
‘watch’ policies and therefore they would not follow the actions of another CRA when applying 
watch signals. To examine further whether the differing watch policies between CRAs between 
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CRAs contribute towards the large number of disagreements, the analysis has been extended 
further to rating opinions without watch level events. Even though the 20-notch scale results 
show that slightly fewer disagreements between CRAs occur than when using the 60-point 
scale, but the overall impact is limited, suggesting that differing ‘watch’ policies are less 
influential and the uncertainty regarding the creditworthiness of banks is the main contributor 
to the split in credit opinions between CRAs. 
 The univariate analysis finds that during the time period examined, 2007-15, both 
CRAs tend to disagree on their rating opinions, although fewer disagreements occur during the 
post-crisis period compared with the sub-prime and European crises, which could suggest that 
both crises caused a large amount of uncertainty between CRAs and this led to more 
disagreements. Vu et al [2015] states that when CRAs disagree in their rating assignments it 
demonstrates some inconsistencies in information, which arises from ambiguity and induces 
wider splits. These results also broadly support previous research (such as Cantor et al [1997]; 
Morgan [2002]) and provide more evidence that ratings between Moody’s and S&P are split 
over fifty per cent of the time (Cantor et al [1997]), particularly during crisis periods. With 
regards to bank assets, Skreta and Veldkamp [2009] suggest that when an issuer’s underlying 
assets are transparent, CRAs provide similar ratings and Iannotta [2006] states that bank 
opacity decreases when fixed assets increase. Hau et al [2013] agree that underlying asset 
complexity is an important determinant in rating quality and accuracy.  
Therefore, this result is anticipated as Moody’s and S&P would be expected to disagree 
when bank opacity is lower, especially during times of uncertainty. Therefore, disagreements 
between CRAs are exacerbated within banks that reside in one of the most affected crisis 
countries,17 a bank with a low credit rating18 and those that are in North America.  
 
17 ‘Crisis country’ includes Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. 
18 A low credit rating is regarded as Baa1/BBB+ or lower. 
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The second research question examines whether conservativeness between Moody’s 
and S&P changes during crisis and non-crisis periods, leading to the following two hypotheses.   
H4. S&P is the more conservative CRA during times of crisis (sub-prime and European) 
because they change their ratings more quickly than Moody’s. 
Exhibit 3 displays the univariate results of which CRA issues a higher/lower rating and 
in general, Moody’s issues a higher rating 51.57% of occasions, compared to S&P issuing a 
higher rating 22.67% of the time and Moody’s issues a higher rating by an average of 1.45 
points. During the sub-prime crisis Moody’s is higher 67.95% of the time compared to S&P 
being higher only 11.26% of the time. On average, Moody’s issues a higher rating of 3.21 
points. The European crisis suggests that Moody’s continues to issue a higher rating but the 
extent is reduced to 53.35% compared with an increase to 25.90%, for Moody’s and S&P, 
respectively. The extent to which Moody’s issues a higher rating has also reduced substantially 
to an average of 0.09 points.  
The multivariate results support S&P issuing a higher rating than Moody’s as all the 
significant variables have positive coefficient suggesting that Moody’s issues a higher rating 
for larger banks, banks within a crisis country, Australasian and North American banks. 
However, the only variables supported using the cluster robust standard error are Bank size and 
North America. Therefore, H4 can be accepted because S&P is the more conservative CRA 
during the sub-prime and European crises. 
H5. Moody’s is the more conservative CRA during the post-crisis period. 
Within the post-crisis period Moody’s issues a higher rating 34.23% of time, compared 
to S&Ps 30.20%, however the TWS shows that S&P are beginning to issue higher ratings with 
the TWS of -0.18 points. Split into regions and timeframes during the post-crisis period, 
Moody’s is the more conservative CRA within Europe 77% of the time compared to S&Ps 
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60% by -1.43 points. Exhibit 4 shows the results using the 20-notch scale and the results follow 
the same pattern as those when using the 60-point scale. H5 can be accepted.  
The results show that during the different time periods the percentage of times Moody’s 
issues a higher rating begins to decrease and the percentage of times S&P issues a higher rating, 
increases. In addition, the TWS has reduced substantially from 3.21 points in the sub-prime 
crisis to -0.18 points in the post-crisis period. This suggests that conservativeness between the 
two CRAs changes as ambiguity levels change.   
Overall, the results show that although S&P is the more conservative CRA, supported 
by Vu et al [2015], this is short lived, as the extent to which Moody’s issues a higher rating 
decreases across time. Alsakka and ap Gwilym [2010] state that Moody’s uses an ‘expected 
loss’ approach when issuing ratings, which includes assessments of both ‘probability of 
default’ and ‘loss given default’ whereas S&P only assesses probability of default. Altman and 
Rijken [2006] state that in 2002 Moody’s attempted to respond to criticisms of rating timeliness 
by changing their rating assignments more frequently. However, investors responded by stating 
they ‘value the current level of rating stability and do not want ratings to simply follow market 
prices’ (Altman and Rijken [2006, p.54]), consequently Moody’s decided to revert back to 
producing stable ratings. This could suggest that Moody’s may be slower than S&P to apply a 
rating change. 
The results provide some strong evidence that the number of splits between CRAs and 
the conservativeness of a CRA does change across all time periods examined as well as regions. 
Therefore, there appears to be no consistency in these areas across the business cycle.     
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether opacity, and therefore disagreements 
between CRAs, increases during crisis periods and whether the conservativeness of CRAs 
changes during these periods. This paper makes a significant contribution to the literature by 
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investigating split ratings of banks based on watch status with the addition of credit ratings 
along with the inclusion of two crises and a post-crisis period. The paper attempts to answer 
questions relating to the opacity of bank ratings and the conservativeness of the two largest 
CRAs throughout differing time periods. 
The main results are as follows: regarding disagreements, Moody’s and S&P agree on 
bank creditworthiness in 25.8% of cases between 2007 and 2015; when the results are broken 
down into timeframes, agreements between CRAs increase to 35.6% during the post-crisis 
period but fall as low as 15.29% for North American banks during the European crises. 
Regarding conservativeness, S&P tends to be the more conservative CRA during the two crises 
but that changes post-crises as Moody’s reverts to being the more conservative CRA. 
In answering the first research question, the evidence is that CRAs tend to disagree on 
their rating opinions. Livingston et al [2007] suggests that ‘some opaque firms may have a 
wide range of credit risk estimates at initial issuance, but the range of credit risk estimates 
happens to fall within rating boundaries…although such firms may have a non-split rating at 
initial issuance, small changes in the credit risk after the initial issuance may move the ranges 
of credit risk estimates up or down to cross a rating boundary, resulting in new split ratings’ 
(p.60). As watch status has been included this has minimised the size of the rating boundary 
and therefore the impact of small changes in credit quality leading to a rating change is limited. 
Consequently, the split ratings identified are more likely to be due to opacity rather than slight 
changes in credit quality. The results support previous research (Cantor et al [1997]; Morgan 
[2002]) that rating assignments are split fifty per cent of the time and provide further evidence 
that ratings between Moody’s and S&P are generally split within the banking sector.   
The second research question examines conservativeness of both Moody’s and S&P. 
The results show that although S&P is the more conservative CRA, however, this is short-lived 
as the frequency at which Moody’s issues a higher rating decreases across time. During the 
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sub-prime crisis Moody’s issues higher ratings than S&P, but by the post-crisis period the 
CRAs tend to issue similar ratings. Alsakka and ap Gwilym [2010] state that due to the differing 
methodologies used by CRAs, Moody’s may be slower than S&P to apply a rating change. 
This is most certainly the case here. Previous research (Cantor et al [1997,1983,1993]; Morgan 
[2002]; Livingston et al [2010]) find that Moody’s is the more conservative CRA and the time 
periods examined range from 1983 to 2008. Vu et al [2015] find the opposite regarding 
conservativeness with a dataset ranging from 2000-2012. Altman and Rijken [2006] state that 
Moody’s had been previously criticised for the timeliness of their rating changes and after 
attempting to respond to such criticisms, investors responded by stating they ‘value the current 
level of rating stability and do not want ratings to simply follow market prices’ (Altman and 
Rijken [2006, p.54]), consequently Moody’s decided to revert back to producing stable ratings. 
Therefore, it could be said that Moody’s is the more conservative CRA but during times of 
uncertainty S&P makes changes to an issuer’s creditworthiness more quickly than Moody’s, 
which gives the impression that they are the more conservative CRA.  
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro [2013] feel that the reputation of a CRA is imperative when 
issuing a rating, however they state that the value of reputation is dependent upon economic 
fundamentals that vary over business cycles. They find by using a dynamic model of ratings 
that a CRA is likely to issue a less accurate rating during booms than during recessions. 
Livingston et al [2010] investigate the relationship between S&P and Moody’s corporate 
ratings and bond yield prices. They find that if there is a split bond rating and Moody’s issues 
the higher rating the bond yield is priced 8 base points lower than bonds with a higher rating 
from S&P. Livingston and Zhou [2010] find that the bigger the rating split, the higher the return 
requested by investors, which is consistent with the view of Livingston et al [2007]. Previous 
research (Hand et al [1992]; Kaminsky and Schmukler [2002]; Bannier and Hirsch [2010]) find 
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that rating downgrades, namely watchlist, have a negative impact on stock market and this 
impact is stronger during crisis periods (Li et al [2008]). 
Overall, a disagreement between CRAs is generally amplified during crisis periods. 
Furthermore, the ambiguous nature of creditworthiness could be deemed as a key factor in 
causing such disagreements, with the delay between applying rating changes remaining a key 
issue. Although the difference between the two CRAs reduces through the time periods, their 
varied methodologies continue to cause a notable divide. The findings of this research have 
implications on the pricing of risk (Livingston et al [2008]), stock market returns (Richards and 
Deddouche, 2003), CDS Markets (Micu et al [2006]) and foreign exchange markets (Alsakka 
and ap Gwilym [2012]) which is imperative to investors. From a company’s perspective these 
results may have an impact on their financing opportunities (Terovitis [2016]) and market value 
(Richards and Deddouche [2003]). Therefore, the knowledge that S&P should be perceived as 
the more conservative CRA over Moody’s during times of uncertainty should help market 
participants to maximise returns through business cycles. Regarding split ratings, this research 
confirms the perception that banking sector issuers maintain a higher level of opacity than their 
corporate equivalents.  
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Exhibit 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel I 
No. of Banks                                        133 
No. of Countries                                     17 
No. of daily Observations             291,288 
Investment Grade                             96.4% 
Speculative Grade                              3.6% 
Panel II 
No. of Observations                           1119 
Mean Bank Size ($m)                   321,694 
Minimum Bank Size ($m)                    159 
Maximum Bank Size ($m)         2,914,202 
Standard Deviation ($m)               484,575 
Mean Profit ($m)                               1,699 
Minimum Profit ($m)                    -23,509 
Maximum Profit ($m)                     28,096 
Standard Deviation ($m)                   3,884 
Mean ROA                                       0.89% 
Minimum ROA                             -11.43% 
Maximum ROA                             16.19% 
Standard Deviation                          1.56% 
∑ Sovereign Split                                -250 
Crisis789                                              360 
Euro Crisis                                            387 
Crisis country                                       102 
Low Credit Rating                                  51 
Australasian banks                               129 
North America banks                           451 
This exhibit is split into two panels; Panel I displays the overall univariate summary statistics of banks and Panel 
II displays the regression statistics.  Bank size, Profit and  ROA are bank specific  information used in the 
regression;  ∑ Sovereign Split is the sum of all splits, Moody’s minus S&P across the timeframe; the remainder, 
Crisis789, Euro Crisis, Crisis country, Low credit rating, Australian banks and North American banks are the total 
observations within each , used in the regression. 
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Exhibit 2. Differences between Moody’s and S&P ratings based on the 60-point/20-notch scale 
This graph displays the extent of the differences between Moody’s and S&P using 60-point scale and 20-notch scale. The differences are calculated by taking the Moody’s 
numeric rating minus the S&P numeric rating. Therefore, if Moody’s issues a higher rating than S&P there will be a positive difference and if S&P issues a higher rating than 
Moody’s there will be a negative difference. The difference is calculated by using the numerical scale in Appendix 2, if the difference is equal to zero then there is no split 


























Differences between Moody’s and S&P 60-point/20-notch
60-point scale 20-notch scale
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Exhibit 3. CRA daily splits based on 60-point scale. 
Panel I 
Overall 
 Observations Non-split Moody’s 
higher 
S&P higher TWS TWS(A) 
Overall (%) 291,288 25.76 51.57 22.67 1.45 3.35 
Time Periods 
2007-09 (%) 93,001 20.79 67.95 11.26 3.21 3.95 
2010-12 (%)  100,062 20.75 53.35 25.90 0.09 0.24 
2013-15 (%) 98,225 35.57 34.23 30.20 -0.18 2.70 
Regions 
Australasia (%) 32,897 42.86 42.08 15.06 1.00 1.92 
N. America (%) 118,874 21.43 60.78 17.79 2.55 3.77 
Europe (%) 139,517 25.42 45.96 28.62 0.61 3.33 
Panel II 
Regions split into time periods 
2007-09 
Australasia (%) 10,355 34.37 44.59 21.04 1.02 2.34 
N. America (%) 39,460 20.05 73.27 6.68 4.09 4.54 
Europe (%) 43,186 18.20 68.69 13.10 2.93 3.79 
2010-12 
Australasia (%) 11,520 39.92 39.32 20.76 0.82 2.06 
N. America (%) 40,581 15.29 62.98 21.73 1.71 3.29 
Europe (%) 47,961 20.77 48.57 30.66 0.57 3.16 
2013-15 
Australasia (%) 11,023 53.89 42.62 3.49 1.18 1.38 
N. America (%) 38,831 29.24 45.81 24.95 0.97 2.59 
Europe (%) 48,371 36.47 23.02 40.51 -1.43 3.09 
Exhibit 3 (Exhibit 4) displays the results of the daily splits using the 60-point scale (20-notch scale). Panel I has 
split the results into the three areas examined, overall, different time periods (Sub-prime crisis, European-Crisis 
and Post-crisis) and regions (Australasia, North America and Europe). Panel II presents the results by region in 
three time periods (Sub-prime crisis, European-Crisis and Post-crisis). TWS: Time Weighted Split. TWS (A): 
Time Weighted Split using Absolute values. ‘Non Split’ represents cases when both Moody’s and S&P agree on 
a rating opinion. ‘Higher’ denotes the CRA which assigned the higher assessment of creditworthiness. ‘TWS’ 




Exhibit 4. CRA daily splits based on 20-notch scale. 
Panel I 
Overall 
 Observations Non-split Moody’s 
higher 
S&P higher TWS^ TWS^(A) 
Overall (%) 291,288 29.81 49.55 20.64 0.50 1.12 
Time Periods 
2007-09 (%) 93,001 23.47 66.74 9.79 1.08 1.32 
2010-12 (%)  100,062 25.95 51.53 22.70 0.03 0.08 
2013-15 (%) 98,225 39.73 31.44 28.83 -0.07 0.90 
Regions 
Australasia (%) 32,897 44.92 41.91 13.17 0.35 0.63 
N. America (%) 118,874 25.68 58.86 15.46 0.87 1.26 
Europe (%) 139,517 29.76 43.44 26.80 0.21 1.12 
Panel II 
Regions split into time periods 
2007-09 
Australasia (%) 10,355 36.34 44.59 19.07 0.35 0.77 
N. America (%) 39,460 23.11 71.15 5.75 1.36 1.50 
Europe (%) 43,186 20.72 68.03 11.25 1.01 1.28 
2010-12 
Australasia (%) 11,520 43.65 38.83 17.52 0.30 0.68 
N. America (%) 40,581 20.59 61.00 18.41 0.61 1.10 
Europe (%) 47,961 26.23 46.20 27.56 0.23 1.07 
2013-15 
Australasia (%) 11.023 54.27 42.62 3.11 0.39 0.46 
N. America (%) 38,831 33.61 44.14 22.26 0.35 0.87 








Exhibit 5. Multivariate regression results for absolute values of split rating. 
 
Robust Std. Err. 
60-point – Absolute (Eq.2) 
Cluster Robust Std. Err. 
60-point – Absolute (Eq.2) 
















Constant 2.728*** 0.384 0.000 2.728*** 1.011 0.008 
Bank Size (BS)i,t  0.043 0.029 0.138 0.043 0.078 0.587 
Sovereign Split (SS)i,t 0.261*** 0.072 0.000 0.261** 0.128 0.044 
Return on Assets (RoA)i,t -16.417** 5.577 0.003 -16.417** 7.925 0.040 
Crisis789t 0.001 0.154 0.996 0.001 0.133 0.995 
EuroCrisist -0.062 0.142 0.663 -0.062 0.082 0.454 
Crisis country (CC)i 1.170*** 0.234 0.000 1.170** 0.543 0.033 
LowCreditRating (LCR)i,t 0.591* 0.357 0.099 0.591 0.860 0.493 
Australasia (AP)i -0.935*** 0.142 0.000 -0.935** 0.392 0.019 
North America (NA)i 0.933*** 0.160 0.000 0.933** 0.442 0.037 
R2  0.1186 R2 0.1186 
Number of Observations 1118 Number of Clusters 133+  
+ Standard Error is clustered by Bank. 
Exhibits 5-6 present the coefficient, standard error and p-value estimates of Eq. (2) - Eq. (3) using data samples 
of selected North American, European and Australasian countries during the period 2007 – 2015. The Exhibits 
show regression results for Cluster Robust Standard Errors. TWS represents the dependent variable, the Time 
Weighted Split of bank i for Absolute value 60-point scale (WA) and 60-point scale (W). The TWS is calculated 
once per bank and repeated 9 times, for each year, across the whole period the splits are examined (2007-15) 
within the regression analysis. Therefore, each bank has 9 observations in the overall TWS, unless a bank is not 
rated at any point during the sample period.    
 
Bank Size (BS)i,t represents the bank size of bank i at time t, using Total Assets figure on the latest set of financial 
statement. Sovereign Split (SS)i,t represents the split between the sovereign rating assigned by Moody’s and S&P 
for the country of bank i at time t. Moody’s minus S&P has also been used here to examine the split and in 
equations 2 and 3 the absolute value of the sovereign split has been used. Return on Assets (RoA) is for bank i at 
time t. Crisis789t represents the dummy variable, Sub-prime crisis, and took a value of 1 if the event took place 
in 2007-09 or 0 if not. EuroCrisist represents the dummy variable, European Crisis, and took a value of 1 if the 
event took place in 2010-12 or 0 if not. Crisis country (CC)i represents a bank residing in a Crisis Country. Crisis 
country took a value of 1 if the bank resided in Portugal (bailout), Ireland (bailout), Spain (spillover) or Italy 
(spillover), or 0 if not. Low Credit Rating (LCR)i,t represents a bank with a low credit rating at time t. A bank with 
a low credit rating, took a value of 1 if the bank had a speculative grade rating, Ba1/BB+ or less at the time of the 
event, or 0 if not. Australasia (AP)i and North America (NA)i represent dummy variables taking the value of 1 if 
bank i is located in Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) or North America (USA and Canada) and 0 otherwise. 
The data set has been winsorised to eliminate any outliers and Huber–White robust standard errors is applied.  
 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Exhibit 6. Multivariate regression results for split rating. 
 
Robust Std. Err. 
60-point (Eq.3) 
Cluster Robust Std. Err. 
60-point (Eq.3) 














Constant -3.267*** 0.659  0.000 -3.267* 1.802 0.072 
Bank Size (BS) i,t  0.315*** 0.048 0.000 0.315** 0.136 0.022 
Sovereign Split (SS)i,t 0.051 0.946 0.588 0.051 0.156 0.744 
Return on Assets (RoA)i,t 6.150 8.486 0.459 6.150 13.919 0.659 
Crisis789t 0.052 0.222 0.816 0.052 0.170 0.760 
EuroCrisist -0.012 0.207 0.953 -0.012 0.119 0.918 
Crisis country (CC)i 0.684** 0.335 0.041 0.684 0.771 0.377 
LowCreditRating (LCR)i,t -0.219 0.342 0.521 -0.219 0.643 0.734 
Australasia (AP)i 0.789*** 0.209 0.000 0.789 0.587 0.181 
North America (NA) i 2.260*** 0.237 0.000 2.260*** 0.669 0.001 
R2  0.1133 R2 0.1133 
Number of Obs. 1118 No. of Clusters 133+ 
  + Standard Error is clustered by Bank. 
Full details are provided in the notes to Exhibit 5. 


















Exhibit 7. Ordered probit regression results for Eq.4 and Eq.5. 
 
Robust Std. Err. 
20-notch – Absolute (Eq.4) 
𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑃𝐿 
Robust Std. Err. 




Coef. Std. Err. p-value Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
Bank Size (BS)i,t  0.073*** 0.026 0.005 0.070*** 0.022 0.001 
Sovereign Split (SS)i,t 0.215** 0.093 0.021 -0.018 0.412 0.668 
Return on Assets (RoA)i,t 2.661 3.343 0.426 7.732** 3.249 0.017 
Crisis789t -0.004 0.128 0.977 0.044 0.089 0.622 
EuroCrisist -0.082 0.119 0.490 0.032 0.085 0.704 
Crisis country (CC)i 4.661*** 0.163 0.000 0.338*** 0.122 0.006 
LowCreditRating (LCR)i,t 4.176*** 0.108 0.000 0.004 0.162 0.978 
Australasia (AP)i -0.529*** 0.131 0.000 0.346*** 0.112 0.002 
North America (NA)i 0.403*** 0.117 0.001 0.476*** 0.090 0.000 
Number of Observations 1118 Number of Observations  1118 
Exhibit 7 present the coefficient, standard error and p-value estimates of Eq. (4) - Eq. (5) using data samples of selected North 
American, European and Australasian countries during the period 2007 – 2015. 𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑃𝐿 represents the SPLIT dependent 
variable taking a value of 0 or 1 to determine whether there is a split or not split for bank i for Absolute values using the 20-
point scale. 𝑇𝑊𝑆𝑖
𝐶𝑂𝑁 represents the CONSERVATIVENESS dependent variable taking the value of -1, 0 or 1. If Moody’s 
issues a higher rating than S&P there will be a positive difference (1) and if S&P issues a higher rating, there will be a negative 
difference (-1) and no disagreement (0). 
Bank Size (BS)i,t represents the bank size of bank i at time t, using Total Assets figure on the latest set of financial 
statement. Sovereign Split (SS)i,t represents the split between the sovereign rating assigned by Moody’s and S&P 
for the country of bank i at time t. Moody’s minus S&P has also been used here to examine the split and in 
equations 2 and 3 the absolute value of the sovereign split has been used. Return on Assets (RoA) is for bank i at 
time t. Crisis789t represents the dummy variable, Sub-prime crisis, and took a value of 1 if the event took place 
in 2007-09 or 0 if not. EuroCrisist represents the dummy variable, European Crisis, and took a value of 1 if the 
event took place in 2010-12 or 0 if not. Crisis country (CC)i represents a bank residing in a Crisis Country. Crisis 
country took a value of 1 if the bank resided in Portugal (bailout), Ireland (bailout), Spain (spillover) or Italy 
(spillover), or 0 if not. Low Credit Rating (LCR)i,t represents a bank with a low credit rating at time t. A bank with 
a low credit rating, took a value of 1 if the bank had a speculative grade rating, Ba1/BB+ or less at the time of the 
event, or 0 if not. Australasia (AP)i and North America (NA)i represent dummy variables taking the value of 1 if 
bank i is located in Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) or North America (USA and Canada) and 0 otherwise. 
The data set has been winsorised to eliminate any outliers and Huber–White robust standard errors is applied.  
 








Appendix 1. List of banks and countries in the data sample 
Bank Country Bank Country 
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Netherlands First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company USA 
American Express Centurion Bank USA First Merit Bank, N.A. USA 
ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd. New Zealand HSBC Bank Australia Ltd Australia 
Arab Bank Australia Limited Australia HSBC Bank plc UK 
ASB Bank Ltd. New Zealand HSBC Bank USA, N.A. USA 
Australia & New Zealand Banking Grp. 
Ltd. 
Australia HSBC France France 
Banca Carige S.p.A. Italy Huntington National Bank USA 
Banca IMI SpA Italy Hypo Public Finance Bank Ireland 
Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro S.P.A. Italy ING Bank N.V. Netherland
s 
Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.a r.l. Italy Intesa Sanpaolo Spa Italy 
Banco BPI S.A. Portugal JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA USA 
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico USA Jyske Bank A/S Denmark 
Banco Santander Puerto Rico USA Kiwibank Ltd. New 
Zealand 
BancorpSouth Bank USA Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg Germany 
Bank of America, N.A. USA Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen GZ Germany 
Bank of Ireland Ireland LeasePlan Corporation N.V. Netherland
s 
Bank of Montreal Canada Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UK 
Bank of New York Mellon (The) USA Macquarie Bank Limited Australia 
Bank of New Zealand New Zealand Manufacturers and Traders Trust 
Company 
USA 
Bank of Queensland Limited Australia Morgan Stanley Bank International 
Limited 
UK 
Bank of  Scotland plc UK Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A. USA 
Bank of the West USA National Australia Bank Limited Australia 
Banque Federative du Credit Mutuel France National Bank of Canada Canada 
Banque PSA Finance France National Westminster Bank PLC UK 
Barclays Bank PLC UK NIBC Bank N.V. Netherland
s 
Bayerische Landesbank Germany Nordea Bank AB Sweden 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd. Australia Nordea Bank Danmark A/S Denmark 
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Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa Spain Nordea Bank Finland Plc Finland 
BMO Harris Bank NA USA Nykredit Bank A/S Denmark 
BNP Paribas France Pohjola Bank plc Finland 
BOKF, NA USA Raiffeisen Bank International AG Austria 
BPCE France Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich 
AG 
Austria 
Branch Banking and Trust Company USA RCI Banque France 
Caisse Centrale Desjardins Canada Regions Bank USA 
Caisse Des Depots et Consignations France Royal Bank of Canada Canada 
Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. Portugal Royal Bank of Scotland plc UK 
Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de 
Barcelona 
Spain Santander UK PLC UK 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada Silicon Valley Bank USA 
Capital One Bank N.A. USA SNS Bank N.V. Netherland
s 
Chase Bank USA, NA USA Societe Generale France 
Citibank International Plc UK Standard Chartered Bank UK 
Citibank, N.A. USA Suncorp-Metway Ltd. Australia 
Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania USA SunTrust Bank USA 
Comerica Bank USA Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 
Commerzbank AG Germany Swedbank AB Sweden 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia Swedbank Mortgage AB Sweden 
Compass Bank USA Synovus Bank USA 
Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment 
Bank 
France TCF National Bank USA 
Credit Agricole S.A. France TD Bank, N.A. USA 
Credit Industriel et Commercial France Toronto-Dominion Bank (The) Canada 
Credit Logement France Trustmark National Bank USA 
Credit Suisse International UK U.S. Bank National Association USA 
Danske Bank A/S Denmark U.S. Bank National Association ND USA 
DEPFA Bank plc Ireland UBS Limited UK 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company USA Ulster Bank Limited UK 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas USA UniCredit Bank AG Germany 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Delaware USA UniCredit Bank Austria AG Austria 




Discover Bank USA UniCredit SpA Italy 
DVB Bank S.E. Germany Union Bank, N.A. USA 
E*TRADE Bank USA Webster Bank N.A. USA 
Erste Group Bank AG Austria Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A. USA 
FIA Card Services, NA USA Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. USA 
Fifth Third Bancorp USA Westpac Banking Corporation Australia 
First Hawaiian Bank USA Westpac Europe Limited UK 
First National Bank of Omaha USA Westpac New Zealand Limited New 
Zealand 


























Appendix 2 – Mapped rating scales (20-notch and 60 point) 
20-notch scale  60-point scale 
Moody’s S&P No. Moody’s S&P No. Moody’s S&P No. 
Aaa AAA 20 Aaa AAA 60 Positive Positive 25 
Aa1 AA+ 19 Negative Negative 59 Ba3 BB- 24 
Aa2 AA 18 Positive Positive 58 Negative Negative 23 
Aa3 AA- 17 Aa1 AA+ 57 Positive Positive 22 
A1 A+ 16 Negative Negative 56 B1 B+ 21 
A2 A 15 Positive Positive 55 Negative Negative 20 
A3 A- 14 Aa2 AA 54 Positive Positive 19 
Baa1 BBB+ 13 Negative Negative 53 B2 B 18 
Baa2 BBB 12 Positive Positive 52 Negative Negative 17 
Baa3 BBB- 11 Aa3 AA- 51 Positive Positive 16 
Ba1 BB+ 10 Negative Negative 50 B3 B- 15 
Ba2 BB 9 Positive Positive 49 Negative Negative 14 
Ba3 BB- 8 A1 A+ 48 Positive Positive 13 
B1 B+ 7 Negative Negative 47 Caa1 CCC+ 12 
B2 B 6 Positive Positive 46 Negative Negative 11 
B3 B- 5 A2 A 45 Positive Positive 10 
Caa1 CCC+ 4 Negative Negative 44 Caa2 CCC 9 
Caa2 CCC 3 Positive Positive 43 Negative Negative 8 
Caa3 CCC- 2 A3 A- 42 Positive Positive 7 
Ca CC 1 Negative Negative 41 Caa3 CCC- 6 
C R 1 Positive Positive 40 Negative Negative 5 
 SD 1 Baa1 BBB+ 39 Positive Positive 4 
 D 1 Negative Negative 38 Ca CC 3 
 Positive Positive 37 Negative Negative 2 
Baa2 BBB 36 C R 1 
Negative Negative 35  SD 1 
Positive Positive 34  D 1 
Baa3 BBB- 33  
Negative Negative 32 
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Positive Positive 31 
Ba1 BB+ 30 
Negative Negative 29 
Positive Positive 28 
Ba2 BB 27 
Negative Negative 26 
 
 
